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Executive summary
The Facility for Oil Sector Transparency and Reform (FOSTER) was a £14 million programme that has helped Nigeria to 
transform its governance of the oil and gas industry. FOSTER ran from 2011 to mid-2016,1 and used an explicit ‘thinking 
and working politically’ (TWP) approach. It was funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and 
managed by Oxford Policy Management (OPM). This paper seeks to identify the factors that drove – or constrained – 
FOSTER’s achievements, and asks what this can tell us about TWP, particularly in challenging political and sectoral contexts. 
FOSTER sought to help strengthen oversight and accountability in Nigeria’s oil sector. It aimed to support reformers within 
government institutions that ‘supply’ accountability (those governing how oil and gas revenues are collected and managed), 
and to support civil society organisations, parliament, the media and the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
to ‘demand’ reform. In addition, FOSTER commissioned a series of studies and provided media training to help broaden 
understanding of the sector and highlight the need for reform.
This paper examines the outcomes from five ‘clusters’ of FOSTER interventions. The FOSTER team viewed the first three of 
these in the list below as successful, whereas the latter two did not deliver on expectations but offer important opportunities 
for learning:
• Support to the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
• Support to demand-side actors to promote transparency and accountability in the oil sector
• Support for the passage of the Petroleum Industry Bill
• An oil spill-mapping social media project
• Support to the Department of Petroleum Resources
The analysis drew on 44 semi-structured interviews conducted during a month of fieldwork in Abuja and Lagos; on reviews 
of the programme’s monitoring, evaluation and learning frameworks; and on newspaper articles and grey literature on 
Nigeria’s oil sector.2  
FOSTER and TWP
FOSTER managed to achieve some remarkable successes in a highly unfavourable political environment as a result of thinking 
and working politically. FOSTER’s work was based on three principles:
• Undertaking deep, regular political economy analysis (PEA) to identify policy failures ripe for action and shifts in context 
that might create opportunities for reform or block previously promising avenues
• Using this insight to nurture relationships with sympathetic stakeholders, both in government and outside, and with them 
develop contextually relevant interventions
• Working discreetly to minimise risks to DFID and programme staff
FOSTER was designed to be a flexible programme in both its funding and its lack of pre-defined interventions. Its managed 
fund enabled the programme to identify initiatives and allocate targeted resources as it went along: the rationale was that it 
was not possible at the outset to know the specific pathways through which change might occur. The programme deliberately 
tried a range of promising approaches, knowing that not all would necessarily succeed. 
Lessons on TWP 
FOSTER’s experience points to important lessons for other programmes seeking to think and work politically.
Process: how interventions are implemented
Well-connected, knowledgeable team: High quality, locally based staff who were well-connected and knowledgeable about 
the target sector played a key role in FOSTER’s successes. FOSTER’s Abuja team was Nigerian-led from the start, and by 2015 
was entirely Nigerian. Staff had strong networks and a deep understanding of the sector’s technical and political challenges. 
1 FOSTER’s successor programme, the ‘Facility for Oil Sector Transformation’, is projected to run until mid-2021.
2 OPM commissioned this study as part of its and DFID’s commitment to learning.
Continuity of personnel: Core staff remained the same throughout the five years, which supported network building. 
However, FOSTER’s experience also highlighted that retention of talented in-country managers can be problematic in 
five-year programmes where roles and fees remain static. 
Adaptability and learning: Flexible programme design that does not lock staff into working with particular institutions or 
organisations offers broad scope for TWP. For example, FOSTER could change its partners as appropriate, reorienting inter-
ventions towards the most receptive stakeholders as the political situation shifted. It could engage with new partners, inside 
or outside government, as opportunities for reform emerged. It could also disengage when interventions did not succeed.
Balancing robust management and adaptability – formality versus swift response: It can be challenging to maintain robust 
management alongside a responsive, politically savvy approach and risk mitigation. For example, it may be difficult for staff to 
fully document learning in a fast-moving, adaptive programme. Not all of FOSTER’s decisions were as well documented as 
they could have been, which made learning – and evaluation – sometimes difficult. 
Demand-driven interventions: FOSTER had most success when its interventions were driven by local partners – for 
instance, FOSTER provided evidence-based information about the oil sector, which a range of partners used to enhance 
public debate. 
Content: what interventions do
Connecting stakeholders and enhancing their capacities: FOSTER played a convening role, strengthening relations between 
CSOs and the media, for example, and invested significantly in building the capacity of local partners. Discretion – such as a 
lack of project or donor branding – was an important factor in facilitating change. 
Sharing accessible research findings and information: FOSTER improved the quality of public debate by making impartial 
evidence more accessible. Unbranded FOSTER-commissioned research and simplified technical information about the oil 
sector came to be viewed as a neutral resource for a range of local actors who wished to shape the public debate.
Clarity of vision:  Clarity of vision is key to flexible programming. Donors and local partners are more likely to be able to 
think and work politically if they have a shared view of what success looks like, what support a programme can and cannot 
provide, and when and under what conditions support for an ineffective initiative will be phased out. In most of FOSTER’s 
interventions, a shared vision was clear. However, in the two more problematic interventions, a lack of clarity of vision was in 
large part responsible for many of the challenges. 
Politics of interventions
Understanding and adapting to the political context: Quarterly PEA was at the heart of FOSTER’s approach. Staff, partners 
and stakeholders sense-checked the PEA reports and discussed their findings and implications at quarterly workshops. 
Informal political assessments by staff and issue-specific PEAs also contributed to FOSTER’s culture of regular critical reflec-
tion and workplan review. Formal PEA was underpinned by a staff team able to work in a politically smart way day-by-day. 
However, given that broad PEAs can lack the nuance needed to drill down deeply into specific issues, FOSTER’s successor 
programme is conducting PEAs on thematic clusters of interventions.
Theories of change for clusters of interventions: Likewise, FOSTER had an overarching theory of change, but clusters of 
interventions could have used their own specific theories of change, to be revisited during implementation. Goals can be 
specified while pathways to achieving them need not be. It is important to embed ways of recognising where new results 
point to the need to adjust a theory of change.  
Risk management: Tolerance of risk to results enables programmes to experiment to find out what does and doesn’t 
work, but it can be challenging to balance such experimentation with avoidance of reputational risk for donors. Further, 
when programmes work with both demand- and supply-side actors, care is needed to manage the risk that the activities 
of programme-supported civil society actors could damage the programme’s relationships with government actors. DFID, 
OPM and the FOSTER team had a relatively high tolerance for risk throughout FOSTER, which was seen to be a key factor 
in its success. However, it was also suggested that this diminished over the life of the programme, possibly due to the use of 
payment by results. This suggests a tension between flexible, adaptive design and accountability mechanisms. For the most 
part, FOSTER managed to balance the two well. 
 
These lessons show both the value of thinking and working politically for a development programme, and the challenges and 
trade-offs involved. While political changes and complexities may make some failure unavoidable, a politically savvy, adaptive 
approach can help programmes learn and respond quickly.
1The Facility for Oil Sector Transparency and Reform (FOSTER) was a £14 million programme funded by the UK Depart-
ment for International Development (DFID). Its first phase ran from December 2010 to mid-2016.1 This paper asks whether 
FOSTER managed to ‘think and work politically’ (TWP), and identifies the challenges and the factors driving its successes and 
failures. It draws on five ‘clusters’ of FOSTER’s programme – three successful cases and two failures – and analyses what these 
tell us about TWP,2 particularly in challenging political and sectoral contexts. 
This is unusual in the growing literature on development programmes that adopt a politically informed, flexible, adaptive 
approach, which tends to emphasise success alone (Dasandi et al., 2016).3 Exceptions to this include recent case studies such 
as those undertaken by Mercy Corps (2016) and the State Accountability and Voice Initiative (SAVI) (2014), which analyse 
the strengths and weaknesses of such programmes. 
Oxford Policy Management (OPM) managed FOSTER and commissioned this research as part of its and DFID’s commit-
ment to sharing learning. FOSTER was one of the earliest programmes that DFID funded with an explicit TWP approach, 
and has been particularly successful in meeting its objectives.4 
As such, FOSTER makes an interesting practical case study example, both for development practitioners and for researchers 
interested in TWP, as well as for those interested in the extractive sector. An objective of this paper is thus for the lessons to 
inform future programming and contribute to the wider evidence base on TWP in aid programmes.5 
The research used a qualitative and inductive approach. Field research by the primary author entailed 44 semi-structured 
qualitative interviews during one month of fieldwork in Abuja and Lagos. The research also included reviews of FOSTER’s 
internal documentation and Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) frameworks, and analysis of newspaper articles and 
grey literature on the oil sector in Nigeria. 
The qualitative interviews aimed to generate a comprehensive overview of each cluster of interventions, including the 
internal working processes of FOSTER during design and implementation and the external impact of the interventions. In 
terms of the internal assessment, this looked at the logic and implicit assumptions of the interventions. Interviews took place 
with FOSTER staff, consultants and partners involved in implementation, and DFID. 
Meanwhile, to be able to ‘externally’ assess the cases, the research interviewed some beneficiaries/targets of the interven-
tions (e.g., journalists who undertook FOSTER’s media training or civil servants who benefited from capacity-building), and 
used newspaper articles and the grey literature to put the changes in context and/or to trace FOSTER’s results (where such 
a link could be made). 
Interview questions focused on ‘whether, why and how’ the clusters of interventions achieved, or did not achieve, the intended 
results within the socio-political context, and how this socio-political context in turn informed the intervention choices. This 
involved looking at issues such as the type of change (policy, practices, capacity, systems, public scrutiny); the extent of change; 
whether results emerged as anticipated (and whether some results were unintended); the reasons for comparative success 
and failure; and the lessons that could be drawn from this, particularly with regard to TWP programme design. 
The research aimed to be as rigorous and objective as possible to generate credible evidence that could be valuable to 
researchers, policy-makers, donors and practitioners interested in governance reform within and outside the extractive 
1 FOSTER had its funding renewed by DFID in 2016, with Oxford Policy Management (OPM) continuing as the service provider. This 
paper does not cover the Facility for Oil Sector Transformation successor programme, projected to run from July 2016 to mid-2021.
2 According to the Thinking and Working Politically Community of Practice: 'A TWP approach has three core principles: strong politi-
cal analysis, insight and understanding; detailed appreciation of, and response to, the local context; and, flexibility and adaptability in 
program design and implementation.' These principles are elaborated at https://twpcommunity.org/what-is-twp/
3 See, for instance, Booth and Unsworth’s (2014) seven case studies of successes using the TWP approach in various sectors. While 
an important contribution to the literature on TWP, though, this research does not consider any failures of the approach.
4 DFID’s overall output score for FOSTER over the five years was A+.
5 See http://twpcommunity.org for examples of other case studies.
1 
Introduction
2sector. A mix of both internal and external researchers was essential to help provide deep insights into FOSTER while also 
maintaining independence in terms of sampling, analysis and interpretation. However, the political salience of the extractive 
sector in this context, and security considerations in oil-bearing communities, had an impact in terms of how close it was 
possible to get to key stakeholders. Some actors, such as political representatives, were more difficult to interview; for 
example, no interviews were conducted with senators who had benefited from FOSTER’s support. However, the methods, 
including triangulation, are robust enough to enable the drawing-out of useful conclusions. 
It was not possible to interview all the actors involved in each case – in particular for clusters with a significant number 
of interventions (e.g. the Petroleum Industry Bill and the demand-side clusters included more than 20 interventions each). 
Nevertheless, an attempt was made to interview as many actors as possible so as to generate an in-depth understanding of 
the logic and processes of the clusters. Using a purposive sampling technique, the FOSTER team initially identified a number 
of interviewees. The list rapidly expanded through a ‘snowball effect’ – that is, through referral to other potential interviewees 
by current respondents who helped identify the most relevant actors. 
The paper is structured as follows. It first, in Section 2, provides an overview of the Nigerian socio-political environment and 
the oil sector, recognising that both the political and the sector contexts are a fundamental part of FOSTER’s story. Section 
3 then sets out what FOSTER is and what its TWP approach looks like. Section 4 provides a brief explanation of each of the 
five case studies and a summary of their findings.6 Section 5 then draws out lessons from across the five case studies, aiming 
to make a contribution to the literature on politically informed programming. Section 6 concludes.
6 Each of the case studies was written up with much more detail as separate papers, used in FOSTER’s internal learning process.
3The political character of development challenges is even more apparent in the governance field, particularly 
in transparency and accountability interventions. (…) [T]he processes by which transparent and accountable 
institutions are formed are deeply political in nature, often shaped by conflict and other forces of social change, 
rather than a linear process of formal administrative and institutional reform based on “best practices” and 
‘political will’. (Halloran, 2014: 1)
This statement reflects well the process of change in oil sector governance in Nigeria, which, with its endemic corruption, is 
a difficult environment in which to navigate and foster reform.
Figure 1: The location of oil fields in Nigeria, as of September 2012
Source: Courtesy of Stratfor Worldview, a geopolitical intelligence platform based in Austin, Texas.  
https://www.stratfor.com/article/dwindling-international-interest-nigerias-onshore-oil-fields
2
The Nigerian socio-
political environment and 
the oil sector
4Nigeria, with both onshore and offshore facilities, is the second biggest oil producer in Africa and ranks 16th in the world in 
terms of production. In spite of its oil wealth, though, the country has some of the worst development indicators in the world. 
The UN Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index 2015 ranks Nigeria at 152 among 186 countries, 
while about 62% of Nigeria’s 173 million people live below the poverty line (UNDP, 2015). Poverty is particularly acute in the 
oil-producing areas of the Niger Delta, where oil production has destroyed the environment and people’s livelihoods without 
creating employment (Burdin Asuni, 2009; Roll, 2011). The oil and gas sector is responsible for around 95% of exports and 
70% of government revenue, which makes Nigeria extremely dependent on the fluctuation of oil prices (IMF, 2015).
Nigeria has established a centralised management system to tax, and thus collect and allocate, oil revenues. During this 
process, the federal government retains the larger share of revenue before distributing the rest to the other tiers of govern-
ment. The system thus enables the retention of an important part of oil revenues by the central government (Obi, 2011), 
while other levels of authority – state and local – have less access to the oil wealth (Barrios, 2013). 
More generally, transparency related to profits from oil is almost non-existent. This opacity is maintained by the Nigerian 
political classes and has enabled both the ruling elite (federal and local) and International Oil Companies (IOCs) to monopo-
lise profits (ICG, 2012). Evidence shows that the national and local elites have been using their share of the oil wealth to 
maintain informal political patronage links and remain in power (Barrios, 2013; Ukeje & Mvomo Ela, 2013). Hence, governance 
problems in Nigeria are said to be a symptom of a ‘massive patronage economy that safeguards the dominance of existing 
Nigerian political elites in and outside of the Delta’ (Newsom, 2011: 5). This very rich Nigerian elite involved in corruption 
and rent-seeking activities has had very few incentives to diversify the country’s economy beyond oil (Gambari, 2008). 
Another major problem concerns oil theft: there is strong evidence that state structures, political leaders and security forces 
in Nigeria are interwoven with the oil industry and criminal networks involved in oil theft (Barrios, 2013). The Nigerian state 
and IOCs have been said to lose more than $1 billion a month to oil theft7 (Wallis, 2012). 
Finally, the role of IOCs should be acknowledged: drawing on their power and resources, IOCs (such as Shell, Chevron Texaco, 
Exxon Mobil, Total and ENI-NAOC) play a crucial role in the Nigerian oil sector. Conflicting interests within the Nigerian 
state have weakened the ability to effectively regulate IOCs as well as nationally owned oil companies. As a consequence, the 
communities of the Niger Delta have experienced decades of conflict and environmental degradation (Obi, 2011).
The context in which FOSTER operated changed almost immediately after its launch in December 2010. President Goodluck 
Jonathan was inaugurated in May 2011, and his incoming policy priorities made no mention of reforming the oil and gas 
sector, despite referring to the need for public sector and power reform. Policy paralysis and uncertainty – and, in some cases, 
wilful resistance to fundamental sector reform – characterised the Jonathan administration from February 2011 to May 2015. 
It is claimed that any reform processes were hindered by the Minister of Petroleum Resources, Diezani K. Alison-Madueke, 
who blocked any initiatives and was involved in various corruption scandals (Awofeso & Odeyemi, 2014; Eniayejuni & Evcan, 
2015). In October 2015, Ms Alison-Madueke was arrested in London as part of an investigation into suspected bribery and 
money laundering (Milmo, 2015). She is being investigated by the Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. 
The election of President Muhammadu Buhari in March 2015 was widely seen as an auspicious moment for radical petroleum 
sector reform. Positive assessments of the president’s personal character, and his electoral mandate secured on an anti-
corruption manifesto, offered the promise of decisive institutional changes in key reform areas – increasing transparency, 
stemming losses and improving revenue capture – and of consideration of options to fundamentally restructure the sector 
in line with these objectives. As this paper shows, FOSTER’s flexible design enabled the team to adjust to the changing – and 
often challenging – political context.
7 This number includes fraud in the allocation of the fuel subsidy.
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FOSTER and Thinking and 
Working Politically 
FOSTER’s overall purpose was to reduce the many incentives for misuse of power and capture of oil revenues in Nigeria. 
The overall intended impact was more effective use of Nigeria’s natural resources. The intended outcome was enhanced 
management of Nigeria’s natural resources. This translated into three output areas:
1. An increase in the extractive industry revenues identified (and returned to the government);8 
2. Improved management and accountability of extractive industry resources; and 
3. Improved policy outcomes for local communities affected by natural resource extraction. 
FOSTER started as a relatively traditional technical assistance programme, intending to work primarily with government on 
reforms to legislation, regulations and building technical capacity.  However, its flexible design allowed it to respond to the 
sudden change of circumstances after the election of the Jonathan administration. In particular, the programme was able to 
pivot towards supporting interventions that promoted demand for reform from civil society. Use of a managed fund played 
a key part in providing the flexibility to make this shift.
Out of a total budget of £14 million, over £8.5 million was for a ‘managed fund’ setup, with the intention of funding interventions 
on an iterative basis throughout the programme lifecycle. Managed funds are one mechanism international development partners 
and agencies use to promote a particular programme objective. The fund is accessed on the basis that the activity to be funded 
falls within the programme’s remit to work on particular themes and to achieve particular indicators of effectiveness and impact. A 
fund manager (in this case, the service provider OPM) provides a set of comprehensive services to support successful programme 
delivery through the fund – for example, appraisal of proposals or direct applications for funds, risk management, financial manage-
ment, ensuring the funded project is in line with the strategic direction of the programme and monitoring and evaluation (M&E). 
The rationale for this design was that it was not possible to know in advance the specific pathways through which change 
might occur. By having a flexibly managed fund, it was possible to identify and allocate resources to initiatives as the programme 
went along. Moreover, the programme deliberately took a ‘portfolio’ approach – trying a range of approaches that seemed 
promising in the knowledge that not all would necessarily be successful.
FOSTER was managed by OPM and implemented by a team in Abuja that was Nigerian-led from the start and, by 2015, 
entirely Nigerian. This enabled the programme to draw on a deep understanding of the politics as well as technical expertise 
in the Nigerian oil and gas sector. It also allowed the programme to draw on the wider relationships and networks the team 
had in place to facilitate and support effective delivery. 
A key aspect of the FOSTER approach was to identify and target9 critical actors and potential reformers within institutions 
to support policy reform, and not to treat institutions uniformly. FOSTER also sought opportunities to strengthen govern-
ment and regulatory systems and institutional capacity, to make institutions more effective in carrying out their oversight and 
accountability roles. Interventions were accordingly focused on one of two approaches: 1) targeting government institutions 
that had responsibility for governing the collection and management of oil and gas revenues (those that ‘supply account-
ability’); and 2) targeting demand-side accountability actors such as civil society organisations (CSOs) and oversight bodies 
(e.g. the Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative [NEITI], Parliament). This latter group provides public scrutiny 
over the sector and can advocate for improvements in governance.
As Figure 2 shows, the approach combined three elements. On the supply side, efforts were made to support champions 
for change through technical assistance and capacity-building. On the demand side, support was given to civil society groups, 
as well as Parliament and the media, to push for reform. Finally, a series of studies, combined with media training, helped 
generate a broader understanding of the sector and highlighted the need for reform.
8 That is, FOSTER both identified revenues that should have been accruing to the government of Nigeria and supported measures 
that enabled the government to capture those revenues.
9 It is important to note that part of the explanation for FOSTER’s success is that it did not actually have calls for proposals; rather, proposals 
came from the core team, which found suitable partners to implement them. This ensured greater coherence and alignment with the 
objectives than would have been the case with a Challenge Fund-type mechanism that solicits and evaluates calls for proposals.
6To identify who to work with, FOSTER staff had to build strong networks that served as levers between the partners and 
FOSTER, and also among the actors themselves. The FOSTER approach to engaging with both supply- and demand-side 
partners was based on identifying policy challenges within the sector and then trying to work with whoever was most 
influential within the ‘reform space’ of the sector to advance these issues around the policy cycle. In this way, the programme 
aimed to leverage its partners’ own efforts and political capital in reforming a few areas within the sector that mattered to 
them. This approach of ‘going with the flow’ was an explicit recognition that the challenges for everyone with an interest 
in substantive reform were vast. In some instances, interventions took place over a longer period (e.g. through embedded 
advisers), but most took place through short-term inputs, such as commissioning scoping studies to collect data, applied 
policy research to address specific research questions, support to CSOs, funding for media groups, facilitation of parliamen-
tary discussions and so on. Over FOSTER’s lifetime, the team can be said to have balanced working on both the supply and 
the demand sides, as well as with the governance institutions – such as Parliament – that sit between them. 
FOSTER had a mandate to be flexible, adaptive and politically well informed. Its operational approach was systemised around 
three core principles:  
1. Undertaking deep, regular political economy analysis (PEA) to identify policy failures ripe for action as well as shifts in 
context that can sometimes create opportunities for reform and other times close down previously promising avenues; 
2. Using this knowledge and intelligence to nurture relationships with sympathetic stakeholders both in government 
and outside to develop with them contextually relevant interventions; and
3. Working discreetly to minimise risks to DFID and programme staff.
The political economy of the extractive sector in Nigeria has a huge influence on the way the government and other 
actors in the space work (see Amundsen, 2017), and, as this paper shows, FOSTER made significant efforts to ensure it was 
sufficiently ‘plugged into’ the political context. As reform pathways vary over time it was important for the FOSTER team to 
regularly seek to make sense of the changing dynamics and powers within government and among those who controlled 
access to the sector. The political economy approach FOSTER developed allowed the team, for the most part, to:
• Plan activities around broad windows of opportunity for influencing the national agenda, such as periods of pre-
election campaigning, the beginning of a new government or the annual budget process; and 
• Identify issues or warning signs, for example to highlight early any major risks the programme may be taking, based 
on uncertain political events that could ultimately affect its impact.
 
Figure 2: An integrated approach to supporting reform 
Source: OPM (2015).
7FOSTER conducted a multitude of interventions from inception using its managed fund. While some of these addressed 
discrete issues, the majority formed part of a ‘cluster’ of interventions that aimed to collectively push forwards reform in a 
particular area of the Nigerian oil sector.10 Clusters of interventions were supposed to have ‘the potential to add up to more 
than the sum of its individual parts’ (Guerzovich & Mills, 2014: 3). This research focuses on some of these clusters. 
A random sampling of clusters would not necessarily have resulted in a selection of ‘successes’ and ‘failures', and so a 
purposive sampling approach was used, starting with an initial consultation with the FOSTER implementation team to identify 
intervention clusters for this study to focus on. The selection criteria went beyond achievement of intended results. They 
included: sustainability once the intervention had closed; unintended results; the significance of the change achieved; and the 
divergence of the reform pathway from that predicted during the design stage of the intervention. 
The consultation process identified five clusters of interventions for study – three considered a success and two considered 
failures. Those considered successful are:
• Case study 1: Support to the NEITI 
• Case study 2: Support to demand-side actors to promote the transparency and accountability of the Nigerian oil 
sector 
• Case study 3: Support for the passage of the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB)
The cluster intervention areas considered to be failures are:
• Case study 4: An oil spill mapping social media project
• Case study 5: Support to the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR)
It should be noted that, while the above were categorised as successes or failures in the consultation with the FOSTER team, 
this research did not take this as a given, and sought to explore this further. In some cases, the findings do not necessarily align 
with the initial classifications. Overall, ‘success’ and ‘failure’ are not ‘hard’ categories here; as the next section demonstrates, the 
story is more nuanced than this, with aspects of adaptation and experimentation in each cluster. 
10 Each intervention also belongs to one of the four established FOSTER workstreams: 1) revenue capture; 2) industry restructuring; 
3) local communities; and 4) accountability. However, many clusters of interventions cut across these workstreams.
8Case Study 1: Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
NEITI is a global standard to promote open and accountable management of natural resources. Its main task is the produc-
tion of regular audit reports that assess, review and reconcile all revenue and investment flows in the oil and gas sector to and 
from government.11 NEITI’s work has been criticised for its limited impact and its uncomfortable position as a government 
agency, as established by the NEITI Act 2007 (Shaxson, 2009). Indeed, the governing board of NEITI, the National Stake-
holders Working Group (NSWG),12 is nominated by the Nigerian president, which limits the amount of pressure the NEITI 
Executive Secretariat can put on the government to act on the audits findings. In this context, FOSTER designed a cluster of 
interventions to support NEITI’s mission through its engagement with all relevant stakeholders. This cluster included a mix of 
capacity-building, technical support, training, advice and dissemination of information.
The NEITI cluster of intervention worked with NEITI at different levels to promote reform. At the institutional level, 
FOSTER helped NEITI apply Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) standards (see EITI International Secretariat, 
2015) through technical advice and an improvement of internal systems, with the objective of enhanced transparency, 
such as through NEITI’s website. This technical support enabled NEITI to adopt a Strategic Plan (see NEITI, 2013) and a 
Medium-Term Sector Strategy, improving its planning capacity, as well as to implement the new EITI standards introduced 
in 2013 (see US Department of Interior, 2013). The knowledge and access of a FOSTER staff member who had done his 
doctoral research on NEITI and had a strong relationship with NEITI’s former chair was particularly useful in implementing 
these interventions, in particular in gaining the trust of NEITI Executive Secretariat staff. Support to NEITI’s website was less 
successful and did not result in its restructuring so as to further transparency and publicise more information: resistance to 
this area of reform was greater than anticipated. 
By connecting, empowering and improving the capacities of stakeholders to play their role within NEITI, FOSTER helped 
NEITI understand and disseminate information more effectively. NEITI audit reports are extremely dense and technical, 
which makes it difficult for stakeholders to understand and use them effectively. To remedy this, FOSTER designed several 
interventions to build the capacities of NEITI Executive Secretariat staff and other stakeholders (e.g. the media and CSOs) to 
analyse, simplify13 and disseminate information from NEITI audit reports through roundtables, training sessions and technical 
advice. All stakeholders interviewed acknowledged the impact of FOSTER’s support on their own work. For example, the 
then-NEITI executive secretary highlighted that the Executive Secretariat now automatically simplified reports internally and 
adapted them to various audiences, something that did not happen prior to FOSTER’s intervention. Another way FOSTER 
managed to empower stakeholders was by making recommendations to the Nigerian president on the election of the new 
NSWG in 2012 to make it more representative.14 Afterwards, FOSTER funded training for the new CSO representatives of 
the NSWG to help them in their role.
FOSTER also supported public awareness and advocacy initiatives on remediation15 related to NEITI’s 2009–2011 audit 
report findings.16 FOSTER supported the dissemination of simplified information on the audit report and provided technical 
11 The audit also looks at physical flows and their allocation between producing companies and government during the year in ac-
cordance with the rules and principles of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
12 The NSWG should be constituted of 15 members drawn from the extractive industry, civil society, labour unions in the extractive 
sector and representatives of the six geo-political zones of Nigeria.
13 See, for example, NEITI (2011).
14 This was a success as, unlike in the previous Board, the members of the new Board were appointed based on their affiliation with 
specific stakeholder groups, including various CSO representatives.
15 Remediation refers here to the process by means of which outstanding payments due from the Nigerian National Petroleum Cor-
poration (NNPC) to the federal government are recovered.
16 The NEITI 2009–2011 audit report (NEITI, 2012) identified over $9 billion in outstanding payments due from the NNPC. The 
remediation process aims to obtain reparation of these. However, after its publication, the institutions responsible for remediation 
did not take any action.
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9support to the advocacy initiative of a coalition of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) led by Publish What You Pay 
(PWYP). PWYP and NEITI (including the executive secretary) emphasised the key role FOSTER played in the recovery of 
$540 million in unremitted oil and gas revenue through the NEITI audit remediation process.
The NEITI cluster of interventions was successful. FOSTER’s engagement with the right stakeholders did improve NEITI’s mission 
to promote open and accountable management of oil and gas. The capacity of the NEITI executive secretary was strengthened, and 
new CSO representatives in the NSWG were empowered. The focus on information simplification and dissemination and support 
to advocacy initiatives raised public awareness on NEITI audit reports and contributed to the remediation process. 
The main lessons from this case are as follows:
• Adapting to the political context: FOSTER’s team understood that the NEITI Executive Secretariat did not want to 
be a campaigning organisation during President Jonathan’s administration. FOSTER’s strategy was therefore to engage 
extensively with the Executive Secretariat while respecting its boundaries (e.g. not putting too much pressure on for 
more transparency or remediation) and engaging CSOs on remediation. The FOSTER team navigated the political 
context in a very informal and instinctive way. It should be noted that no theory of change17 or cluster-specific PEA 
existed to inform the cluster, which depended instead on the FOSTER team’s own expertise and knowledge. 
• A well-informed and well-connected team: This was crucial to build trust through institutional support to NEITI 
and engagement with CSOs. Building and sustaining relationships over time with key stakeholders, both inside and 
outside government, was fundamental to the success of FOSTER. The contacts and networks FOSTER developed 
and sustained – in government, with the private sector and civil society – enabled it to respond at the right times to 
the right issues. By positioning itself as the ‘go-to’ place to discuss oil and gas sector reform, it carved out a privileged 
position at the heart of local debates. The team developed a role as a broker of information and evidence, as a cata-
lyst responding to opportunities. Overall, FOSTER initiated and supported debate at arm’s length rather than taking a 
front seat and pushing an agenda. It also worked strategically through partners, which helped insulate its relationships 
with one stakeholder from its relationships with another. 
• Flexibility: FOSTER’s flexibility enabled it to seize opportunities, such as in nominating the NSWG and designing 
small creative interventions (e.g. simplification of the NEITI audit report).
• Demand-driven and locally owned interventions: Emphasising skills transfers was key to building the in-house 
capacity of NEITI and civil society actors, enabling them to simplify and analyse NEITI audit reports rather than con-
tracting this activity out to external actors. This was particularly emphasised in interviews with FOSTER’s partners in 
the NEITI Executive Secretariat and by PWYP.
• Connecting stakeholders: FOSTER’s strategy to connect stakeholders (NEITI and CSOs) and support advocacy 
platforms was crucial to the success of the remediation process.
• Information dissemination: A key success factor was the emphasis on simplifying and disseminating information, 
from the audit reports in particular, which increased the amount of data publicly available and contributed to the 
remediation process.
This case study provides lessons on how to put together a holistic package of interventions to tackle the challenges in one 
specific area. This ‘package approach’ was enabled by the flexible managed fund, which allowed the FOSTER team to stay 
tuned to what was emerging in the operational context in order to be able to adapt ongoing interventions to complement 
pre-existing ones that had proved to have traction. In this, it moved beyond the traditional ‘transparency agenda’ towards a 
more integrated approach to the politics of reform, creating widespread understanding of the problems, building the capacity 
of reformers in government and strengthening the ability of civil society actors to hold governments and companies to account. 
Case Study 2: Engagement with demand-side actors
In its first years of programming, FOSTER anticipated government agencies in Nigeria would be the main pathway to trigger 
governance reforms and to improve transparency and accountability in the oil sector. However, from 2013, FOSTER increas-
ingly oriented its support towards the demand side, given the Jonathan administration’s lack of appetite for institutional 
reforms. This involved seeking evidence to enable a better understanding and diagnosis of problems in the sector and building 
a wider appetite for reforms through work with demand-side partners able to advocate for these (professional bodies, 
media outlets, think tanks, research organisations, trade unions, CSOs). Working with demand-side actors in the Nigerian 
context was not straightforward. CSOs lacked the capacities and skills needed to undertake advocacy initiatives; the quality 
of investigative journalism was low; and media houses faced influence from political elites. 
17 Each intervention linked to the log frame and to the overall theory of change of FOSTER. In general, the clusters of interventions 
did not have their own formal theory of change. However, other clusters (e.g. PIB) did have an informal theory of change: they 
were driven by a set of assumptions even if these were not explicitly stated as a theory of change.
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The assumption driving the demand-side cluster of interventions was that increased transparency would lead to changes 
in operations within the oil and gas sector and that the demand and supply side were in an adversarial relationship – thus 
working with demand-side actors would lead to change on the supply side. It was also assumed that FOSTER’s promotion 
of a more informed and extensive public debate on oil sector governance, as well as support to advocacy initiatives, 
would trigger greater commitment to governance reforms and improved publication of data by the government. The cluster 
consisted of four categories of interventions driven by an initial mapping of actors, key issues, platforms and information gaps.
Commissioning and disseminating research: FOSTER commissioned three pieces of research to enhance public debate on 
core oil sector issues. These were disseminated to CSOs, the media and the private sector. 
1. In 2011, FOSTER conducted preliminary research into Nigeria’s systems and processes for selling its crude oil.18  This showed 
the waste, politicisation and abuse of discretion of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation’s (NNPC’s) processes. 
2. After the 2012 mass demonstration against the government’s decision to remove fuel subsidies, FOSTER commissioned 
the ‘Citizen Guide to Energy Subsidies’ (CPPA & IISD, 2012). This explains the inefficiencies and corruption practices 
of the fuel subsidies system and makes the case for a full deregulation of the downstream sector19 on the basis that 
there is little evidence that fuel subsidies are a pro-poor initiative. In 2013–2014, FOSTER commissioned NOI Polls20 
to monitor the effectiveness of price controls; this revealed that over 52% of Nigerians purchased petrol at a cost over 
the subsidised price. This triggered responses from government agencies,21 and there is evidence to suggest that the 
Nigerian public started understanding the rationale to remove fuel subsidies (based on a PEA on fuel subsidy reform 
undertaken by FOSTER). 
3. Research on oil theft, including ‘Nigeria’s Criminal Crude: International Options to Combat the Export of Stolen Oil’ 
(Chatham House, 2013) and ‘Communities not Criminals – Illegal Oil Refining in the Niger Delta’ (SDN, 2013), provided 
new perspectives by showing that, while oil theft networks are international, the core responsibility and the most 
efficient level of response lie in Nigeria. 
Media support: The initial assumption driving FOSTER’s media support was that enhancing media content would increase demand 
for advocacy and information dissemination, but focusing only on addressing knowledge gaps about the oil and gas sector proved 
unsuccessful. The approach was therefore reoriented to focus on technical assistance and capacity-building, to meet demands from 
journalists for the skills to interrogate data, develop stories, investigate issues, identity sources and cultivate relationships.  
An initial failure, for example, was a grant given to a major Nigerian newspaper to investigate and analyse price and volume 
information on oil and gas revenue.22 An unexpected lack of skills and capacity meant the journalists were unable to publish 
monthly data or to then sufficiently develop improved analysis. 
Learning from this, FOSTER designed a comprehensive mentoring programme for journalists, assessing both their investigative 
skills and technical sector knowledge in order to be able to devise a joint project to develop skills. As a result, Nigerian journalists 
started to publish more stories on the oil sector, with a higher degree of effectiveness. For example, many journalists trained 
by FOSTER exposed dubious government-to-government crude oil deals, notably in the Berne Declaration story.23 Meanwhile, 
although transparency indicators often fail to ignite citizens’ interest, because they are abstract and beyond most people’s under-
standing, FOSTER was also able to help demand-side actors develop new skill sets, which spoke to the beneficiaries’ own incen-
tives, and which helped them to connect emotionally with citizens to re-energise pressure on companies and the government.
CSO support: Support to CSOs was strengthened in 2013 after FOSTER’s annual PEA emphasised the increasing difficulty 
of the political context and the need to re-orient its programming towards demand-side actors as the supply-side space 
contracted. FOSTER seized key political opportunities and built on its commissioned research to support CSO advocacy 
strategies. For example, it took advantage of the Ribadu Report – which detailed the dysfunctions and corruption of oil 
governance in Nigeria24 – to give grants to the Wole Soyinka School of Investigative Journalism (WSSIJ) to put pressure on 
government agencies to conduct investigations and start criminal proceedings into oil sector corruption. It also gave small 
grants to 11 journalists to write stories about these issues.25  
18 Crude oil selling accounted in 2011 for approximately 70% of Nigerian government revenues.
19 The downstream sector includes refining, distribution and marketing. Deregulation of the downstream sector means liberalising the 
sector to open it to investors. It thus entails removing restrictions such as fuel subsidies.
20 NOI Polls is a country-specific polling service in West Africa.
21 The Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Authority (PPPRA) showed its interest in monitoring sales above subsidy prices, and 
the minister of petroleum publicly requested the help of CSOs in monitoring prices around the country.
22 Premium Times was supposed to publicise the (estimated) disaggregated revenue data, and to develop analysis and shape public 
discourse around the gaps between gross revenues earned and net revenues swept into the Federation Account.
23 The Berne Declaration report raised concerns about sales by NNPC to oil traders based in Switzerland at below-market rates. It 
also accused Swiss trading firms of dealing with Nigerian individuals and companies suspected of corruption.
24 The Ribadu Report is one of the outcomes of the probes initiated by the government in the oil sector (Ribadu, 2012).
25 These stories were published on www.probeng.org
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In 2013–2014, FOSTER built on its oil thefts reports by giving grants, training and capacity-building support to CSOs to 
implement advocacy strategies demanding action on oil theft. This led to the establishment in mid-2013 by the Navy of a 
‘Combat Oil Theft’ page on its website,26 and to the disclosure by NNPC, the Navy, the Nigerian Air Force and the Joint Task 
Force of their efforts to deal with oil theft in 2014. 
Finally, from 2013 FOSTER supported establishment of the Oil Revenue Tracking Initiative (ORTI) – a media platform on 
oil and gas revenue.27 ORTI was given a grant, information and support to develop an advocacy campaign to improve the 
weak level of public dialogue. It then published information highlighting areas of revenue leakage, using info-graphics, booklets 
and simple explanations, as well as a ‘transparency index’ to compare the accessibility and relevance of data in the public 
domain from key agencies responsible for the oil and gas sector.28 FOSTER’s M&E process found the data publicised by ORTI 
(together with the Chatham House report on oil theft) contributed to NNPC publishing more data on its website than ever 
before.
Private sector support: FOSTER worked with the Petroleum Club Lagos Roundtable29 and the oil sector labour unions 
(the Nigeria Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers [NUPENG] and the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff 
Association of Nigeria [PENGASSEN]) to promote their inputs into oil sector debates, and the Centre for Public Policy 
Alternatives (CPPA) to improve the technical and advocacy skills of the unions. In each instance, the activities did not result 
in the intended outcomes. The recommendations made on licensing to the Department for Petroleum Resources in 2012 
were never applied. The grant to CPPA did not increase the union’s technical and advocacy capacity to the extent envisaged 
and NUPENG and PENGASSEN in turn had limited capacity to follow through with the strategy advocated by FOSTER..
Overall, however, this cluster of interventions led to a significant improvement in the level and quality of public debate 
on oil in Nigeria. Partners in this cluster asserted that, had FOSTER not existed, oil and gas issues would still have been 
discussed, but the debate would not have been as informed or extensive.30 The investigative skills of oil sector journalists and 
the capacities of CSOs also improved. Journalists interviewed claimed they did not know any serious journalist in Abuja and 
Lagos working on the oil sector who had not benefited from FOSTER. 
The main lessons from this case are as follows:
• A knowledgeable and well-connected team: This was crucial to navigate the demand-side environment and to 
choose actors with whom to engage. In particular, FOSTER continuously evaluated and mapped demand-side actors 
in an informal way by following traditional and social media, and used its extensive civil society networks to choose 
the actors to engage.
• Understanding and adapting to the political context: FOSTER used windows of opportunity in the political context 
(e.g. 2012 mass protests against the removal of fuel subsidies and government probes into the oil sector) and the 
renewed interest of the public to design new interventions. 
• Flexibility and adaptability: This enabled the team to learn from and deal with problems arising. For example, the me-
dia theory of change was reoriented towards technical assistance, to address the overall lack of capacity in the media. 
After 2013, FOSTER also reduced its number of partnerships with CSOs, by prioritising high quality partnerships and 
focusing on strengthening their capacity first, to increase the efficiency of their advocacy initiatives. Hence, FOSTER 
staff showed the ability to learn and adapt in response to new evidence and to develop innovative responses.    
• Connecting stakeholders: FOSTER’s emphasis on being a neutral actor with an ‘orchestrating role’ to connect stake-
holders was key in improving public debate on oil governance and triggering responses from government agencies. 
Platforms and coalitions were strengthened for this purpose and relationships between the media and CSOs were 
supported by FOSTER to give more visibility and leverage to advocacy initiatives (e.g. the work on oil theft and the 
work done by WSSIJ).31 
• Research and information dissemination: Part of the cluster’s success owed to FOSTER’s emphasis on commission-
ing and disseminating research to all relevant stakeholders. This improved the public debate on oil governance and 
put pressure on government agencies. FOSTER became a repository of knowledge for multiple actors in search of 
reliable information, which helped shape public debates on oil and gas. This was possible because FOSTER remained 
‘discreet’. For example, no information was FOSTER- or DFID/UKAid-branded, which meant partners had more 
incentive to use it. 
26 See http://cot.navy.mil.ng/index.php.
27 See http://oilrevenueng.org/
28 After FOSTER supported the upgrade of the ORTI website, the number of visitors increased from 150–200 to 21,000 per day.
29 The Petroleum Club was established in 2006 as a private members’ club where the leaders of the oil and gas industry can interact.
30 For example, ORTI’s founder noted that, during the 2015 election campaign, every political platform had to address the issue of 
natural resources, which was unusual. For him, this was a result of FOSTER’s four-year engagement with demand-side actors.
31 All CSO staff and journalists interviewed reported that, thanks to FOSTER, they understood better the value of working together.
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• Monitoring and evaluating results: FOSTER had difficulties in this domain. A cluster attempting to shift attitudes 
could achieve only so much impact in the short timeframe in which FOSTER was working. Moreover, although an 
important result from this cluster concerned improvements to public debate, this was not included in FOSTER’s log 
frame, even though it clearly supported FOSTER’s targeted outcome – the enhanced management of Nigeria’s natu-
ral resources. Even if the log frame had included ‘quality of public debate’, it would have been difficult to find good 
measures for such an outcome. When evaluations try to account for this, they typically use somewhat meaningless 
measures, such as ‘number of times x is mentioned in the media’. However, even though ‘quality of public debate’ is 
subjective, more could have been done to trace this type of result through in-depth qualitative and/or quantitative 
studies and by closely following media outputs. This could also have helped capture some of the unintended results 
of the interventions. 
Crucial to FOSTER’s success in this cluster was an understanding of when to facilitate collaboration and when to use more 
confrontational approaches. This also entailed understanding when partnership and dialogue were unlikely to yield results 
because interests fundamentally diverged, and then ‘taking sides’ with pro-reform actors who were engaged in a contentious 
struggle for change. The emphasis was on both playing a convening role and developing the capacities of local organisations. 
This meant FOSTER could competently engage in change strategies involving state actors and institutions, through collabora-
tion and/or contestation, drawing on political analysis of leverage points and windows of opportunity.
Case Study 3: Petroleum Industry Bill 
The proposed PIB is a piece of legislation that aims to provide an overarching framework for the reform of the Nigerian 
petroleum industry. It plans for a separation of functions along three lines: policy, regulatory oversight and commercialisa-
tion/privatisation. Its provisions include strengthening and establishing new institutions and regulatory authorities covering 
national policy and sector oversight, and it entails the corporatisation of government bodies, including NNPC. As a systemic 
reform, the PIB affects all stakeholders of the oil and gas sector and raises public debate on the potential scope and depth of 
changes (Gboyega et al., 2011). The debates and the possibility for reform are complicated by the vested interests of major 
stakeholders such as the (then-)minister of petroleum32 and the IOCs,33 and by issues raising regional divides, such as the 
Petroleum Host Communities Fund (PHCF) (see Pérouse de Montclos, 2014).34 
The first version of the PIB was presented to the National Assembly in 2008; since then, several further versions have 
been produced. In 2011, the federal government established a Special PIB Task Force, supported by a technical committee, 
to produce a new draft for presentation to the National Assembly. This new executive version of the PIB was sent to the 
National Assembly in August 2012. At this point, the House of Representatives established an ad hoc committee to examine 
the PIB, eventually adopting a redrafted version in June 2015. However, the Senate did not follow the example of the House 
and chose not to adopt the draft PIB. As it has to be passed by both the House and the Senate to become a law, efforts to 
pass the Bill during the 2011–2015 legislature stalled. 
From 2011 to 2015, FOSTER tried to improve the Bill’s provisions and support its passage under President Jonathan’s 
administration.35 It began with the establishment of the Special PIB Task Force in 2011. The underlying assumption driving 
this cluster of interventions was that lack of consultation and information on the PIB was the main hindrance to its passage. 
Consequently, the cluster was in large part designed to engage all stakeholders and improve the quality of their knowledge 
on the content of the PIB and international best practices. Hundreds of pages of the PIB were broken down through policy 
briefs and fact sheets, making them accessible to non-technical audiences. Three types of stakeholders were supported:
1. Institutional actors: FOSTER worked with the Special PIB Task Force, the Ministry of Finance, the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate to improve their knowledge of the PIB and identify reformers, to obtain the buy-in of these 
institutions for the passage of the PIB. These actors had little prior knowledge of the oil and gas sector. This engagement 
was conducted mainly by means of technical advice and support, such as the funding of Nigerian embedded advisors in 
these institutions, the facilitation of meetings, support to key leaders and technical reviews of the PIB. This resulted in the 
integration of several FOSTER recommendations into various versions of the PIB. While several interviewees (including 
from within government) testified to an improvement in the National Assembly’s knowledge on the PIB, some evidence 
also suggests limits to FOSTER’s work at the National Assembly, which was very much constrained by the political 
32 Throughout the period in which FOSTER was working, the minister of planning was very concerned with, among other things, 
keeping her power to award oil blocks on a discretionary basis.
33 The IOCs were mostly lobbying around the fiscal dimension of the PIB to ensure that it would provide them with more favourable 
fiscal conditions.
34 The PHCF was introduced by the 2012 PIB presented to the National Assembly, which proposed that every upstream petroleum 
producing company remit 10% of its operational net profit to the PHCF to contribute to the development of the communities 
within the petroleum-producing areas.
35 In the past year, under President Buhari’s administration and after the process stalled in the Senate, renewed efforts have emerged, 
in this case to unbundle the bill and to pass it in pieces. However, this case study focuses on FOSTER’s support of the long-standing 
legislative process to pass the PIB between 2011 and 2015
13
environment. Interviewees highlighted vested interests of various institutional actors and, hence, limitations as to what 
could be achieved. It was also challenging to engage Senate members who were aligned with the executive position on 
the PIB and who were, in addition, preparing for the next general elections.
2. Civil society: FOSTER worked with civil society actors to improve their understanding of the PIB and build their 
advocacy capacity through technical support in order to increase pressure on the executive and the National Assembly 
(e.g. support to draft policy position papers to the House of Representatives PIB Committee). To do so, FOSTER also 
gave grants to independent research institutions, policy think tanks and law firms to undertake research on the PIB 
before connecting them to CSOs and journalists, who then disseminated the information. For example, many articles in 
this period used FOSTER information to highlight problems with the PIB.36 
3. Private sector actors: FOSTER’s aim was to increase its input into the PIB process by supporting the creation of 
a coalition to promote a unified private sector voice on PIB issues. FOSTER provided private actors with their first 
platform to discuss how the PIB affected them as a group. Moreover, it funded a series of roundtable and workshops37 
that led to presentation of a policy recommendations brief to the Special PIB Task Force, with one of these recom-
mendations adopted in the PIB draft.
The above interventions took place alongside intensive diplomatic influencing efforts by the UK and other countries, whose 
purpose was to strengthen the governance and transparency arrangements of the PIB. This in turn presented an avenue for 
FOSTER to engage with, for example, the Ministry of Finance on this issue.
At the end of FOSTER’s efforts in 2015, the PIB had still not been passed. While several of FOSTER’s recommendations 
were integrated in the House and the Senate PIB drafts, there is no guarantee of their longevity, as the new administration 
can either pass the bill in pieces or revert to an earlier version. Moreover, more than 75% of the members of the National 
Assembly changed with the general election. Hence, while FOSTER worked to increase understanding of the PIB, there 
are now numerous new actors in need of support.  While these events were not within FOSTER’s control, this reflects the 
challenges of aiming for systemic change within the political context at that point in time. 
This case study shows mixed results. Rather than being a simple story of either success or failure, it highlights how FOSTER’s 
TWP approach enabled it to engage as effectively as possible in a fluid and politically challenging environment.38  
The main lessons from this case are as follows:
• A knowledgeable and well-connected team: The FOSTER team was able to make sound decisions concerning who 
to engage and how to work with National Assembly members, CSOs and private actors. An example is the strong 
relationship established with the deputy speaker of the House of Representatives, who championed the passage of 
the PIB in the House.
• Connecting stakeholders: FOSTER’s strategy of presenting itself as a neutral actor linking stakeholders and support-
ing the creation of platforms to discuss the PIB was key to keeping the PIB debate focused on the core issues and 
generally improving its quality, at both the public and the National Assembly level. Hence, CSOs partners interviewed 
saw FOSTER as the only objective actor looking at the PIB in its entirety and at its effect on the whole of Nigerian 
society.
• Research and information dissemination: FOSTER’s emphasis on commissioning and disseminating research on the 
PIB to all relevant stakeholders was crucial to improve the public and National Assembly debates on PIB.
• Monitoring and evaluating results: Log frame and M&E approaches did not adequately track FOSTER’s important 
impact on the public debate and on improving the knowledge of stakeholders. Better data on this would almost 
certainly highlight the fact that some aspects of the cluster did work well and made some contributions (see Roche 
& Kelly, 2012a, 2012b).
• Dealing with highly complex political areas: It was not possible to say with high certainty whether or not the PIB 
could have passed before the 2015 election. DFID and FOSTER worked on the PIB because it was potentially ‘game-
changing’ legislation that could help transform or significantly set back Nigeria’s governance of the oil industry had it 
been signed into law.
36 See, for instance, Alohan (2015) and Okwe (2015).
37 These brought together key private sector stakeholders, oil and gas trade unions, governors of the Niger Delta states and members 
of the National Assembly Upstream and Downstream Committee.
38 It could be worth comparing FOSTER’s approach with the approach used by the Coalitions for Change team in the Philippines 
(Booth, 2014; Sidel, 2014). Although the two programmes are quite dissimilar, there could be shared lessons on getting difficult 
legislation through in challenging environments.
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• Shared risk between the donor and the service provider : This was an example of where DFID and FOSTER 
showed high tolerance for risk to results in an important area. DFID jointly owned this risk with the FOSTER pro-
gramme, and there was effective collaboration between FOSTER and DFID on the political risks and opportunities 
throughout. A number of stakeholder mappings were carried out and used to inform influencing strategies and help 
target support, on both the FOSTER and the DFID side, and a lot of successful influencing was achieved in terms of 
both the positions adopted in the draft legislation and shifting the public debate to focus on key governance areas. 
• Linkages with wider UK priorities: FOSTER’s extensive work in this area helped inform a strong influencing position 
for the UK government and a coalition of other countries on industry governance and transparency of the sector. 
These positions were pushed at high levels by the UK and other countries with Nigerian counterparts, and comple-
mented FOSTER’s activities. The FOSTER team’s programmatic PEA was triangulated with UK government analysis, 
albeit in a partial and ad hoc manner, on the political likelihood of the PIB passing. This made it possible to make 
informed decisions on continuing programming based on a full picture of risks and potential rewards. 
Case Study 4: Social media oil spill map39 
Oil spills are a major economic and environmental challenge in Nigeria, with over 1,500 a year. The 2011 Environmental 
Assessment of Ogoniland40 by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) estimates that the clean-up of this region of 
the Niger Delta will cost $1 billion and take up to 30 years (UNEP, 2011). Beyond the cost in terms of oil production and 
clean-up, the liabilities linked to environmental damage are difficult to estimate – but considerable. The continuous degrada-
tion of the coastal environment hampers fishing and makes land infertile. It threatens the traditional livelihoods of local 
people, who then are drawn to illegal activities and militancy (ICG, 2012: 4; Onuoha, 2013: 283).
No effective national mechanisms are in place to deal with oil spills. Although DPR and the National Oil Spill Detection and 
Response Agency (NOSDRA)41 have mandates to deal with oil spills, these are overlapping and competing, resulting in signifi-
cant inefficiencies, and legislation in this area is unclear (see Maitland & Chapman, 2014). Liability for many of the spills lies 
partly with NNPC (through joint ventures),42 yet DPR reports to the minister of petroleum, who, until recently, was also the 
head of NNPC. This limited DPR’s ability to be an effective regulator. NOSDRA does not have enough power or resources 
to enforce the regulatory framework to deal with oil spills,43 or enough mapping and tracking capabilities to provide sufficient 
evidence on oil spills. Both of the underlying issues with these agencies mean oil companies and relevant actors involved with 
them face few consequences for failing to uphold environmental standards and regulations. 
In this context, FOSTER’s Citizens’ Engagement through Social Media Oil Spill Map intervention aimed to remedy the infor-
mation and evidence deficit arising as a result of NOSDRA’s weaknesses through the launch of a community-based oil spill 
map. Designed as an advocacy project, the objective was to give a voice to communities living with oil spills to put pressure 
on the responsible authorities – NOSDRA, DPR and the federal government. 
Initially, three phases of interventions were planned in this cluster. In 2011–2013, the first phase supported the development 
by the West African NGO Network (Wangonet) of an online portal (the assumption being that Wangonet would retain 
management of this) and a mobile app to track and report oil spills in the Niger Delta. The portal was set up to capture 
and disseminate information. This phase also included training and equipping field operators identified by the National 
Coalition on Gas Flaring and Oil Spills in the Niger Delta (NACGOND), a network of NGOs based in the Niger Delta, to 
serve as oil spill monitors and reporters. The design assumption was that Wangonet would continue to be the interface with 
NACGOND. The second and third phases entailed supporting NACGOND’s advocacy strategy. 
The cluster was driven by two underlying assumptions: 1) that local communities have strong interests in preventing and 
remedying oil spills, which will ensure their participation with the platform; and 2) that the Nigerian authorities would be 
responsive to this type of advocacy and act on the information provided. These assumptions proved to be unfounded, and 
the cluster was ended before the start of the second phase.
Phase 1 was carried out in 2011 by Wangonet. After setting up the online portal and the mobile app, Wangonet staff 
conducted training for NACGOND operators and field agents. NACGOND was chosen as it is based in the Niger Delta and 
claimed good access to local communities. This latter was subsequently revealed to be extremely limited. Even the security 
clearance with state authorities to go into the creeks was not in place. This in turn led to Wangonet staff being confronted 
39 It is important not to confuse this intervention with the Online Oil Spills Mapping and Tracking Platform with the National Oil Spill 
Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), which was not community-based, and which is generally regarded as a success.
40 Ogoniland is a region covering around 1,000 km2 in Rivers State in the Niger Delta. It has been the site of oil industry operations 
since the late 1950s (UNEP, 2011).
41 http://www.nosdra.org.ng/
42 NNPC usually enters into an agreement with one or more oil companies to develop jointly held oil prospecting licences.
43 UNEP 2011 highlights the lack of proactivity of NOSDRA given the limited resources allocated to the agency. NOSDRA even relies 
on oil industry logistical support to plan its inspection visits.
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by military officers in the creeks. NACGOND had also selected field agents from outside of the communities that needed 
to be accessed, posing further difficulties accessing the creeks and ultimately undermining the project’s ability to achieve its 
aim to empower local communities. The assumption that communities have strong interests in preventing and remedying oil 
spills was also questioned when the local community denied visiting FOSTER staff access to the oil spill without payment. 
By 2013, FOSTER decided that NACGOND instead of Wangonet should manage the social media map, in order to ensure 
its sustainability. The rationale was that Wangonet was based in Lagos whereas NACGOND was the main civil society 
coalition located in the Niger Delta working on oil spills. Given the prior issues around access by NACGOND, this was 
in many senses an unorthodox decision. The transition to NACGOND was not successful: NACGOND was not able to 
assume ownership and asked FOSTER for additional funding to pay field agents and manage the platform. By this time, 
FOSTER had determined that NACGOND should be able to use its own resources to make the platform operational, and 
the payment of field agents was in contrast with the assumption that local communities would freely report oil spills out of 
self-interest. NACGOND’s perspective was that FOSTER should not have expected it to manage the platform alone. In the 
end, the portal did not go on to be used for advocacy purposes by NACGOND, as FOSTER, assessing the first phase as a 
failure, terminated the intervention before starting its support to NACGOND’s advocacy strategy. 
The main lessons from this case are as follows:
• Evidencing assumptions: FOSTER’s assumptions were not based on good enough research. This directly led to 
wrong assumptions and, ultimately, failure of the intervention. For example, the FOSTER manager realised while 
implementing the project that many people living in the local communities used oil leakages to make money, including 
by asking oil companies for money in exchange for silence, and that this decreased their incentives to report oil spills. 
The intervention depended on widespread behaviour change, within both the communities and government, but 
there was not enough prior analysis to determine if it was reasonable to expect such changes. If the project’s assump-
tions had been tested more rigorously in advance, the intervention’s design would likely have looked very different. 
• A focus on sustainability: Insufficient attention was paid at the outset to the project’s sustainability, which hampered 
implementation of the intervention.
• Choosing the right partners for reform: When FOSTER works well, partners are more than partners – they are 
entrepreneurs in reform. While the intervention idea was highly innovative, the partnerships involved were not set 
up to enable the most effective delivery or sustainability of the intervention. 
 Case Study 5: Department of Petroleum Resources 
This cluster of interventions targeted the Department of Petroleum Resources, the regulator of the petroleum industry, 
which reports directly to the minister of petroleum resources. DPR is intended to act in the interests not only of government 
and operators but also of communities, consumers and downstream beneficiaries of oil sector operations. Key tasks are to 
supervise all petroleum industry operations carried out under licences and leases; to enforce safety and environmental regu-
lations; to keep updated records on petroleum industry operations (petroleum reserves, production and exports of crude 
oil, gas and condensate, licences and leases, etc.) and inform the government; and to process all applications for licences. 
Under President Jonathan, DPR had to operate in a difficult context that was unfavourable to reforms and characterised 
by extensive corrupt practices, allegedly enabled by the then-minister of petroleum resources (Awofeso & Odeyemi, 2014; 
Eniayejuni & Evcan, 2015). 
The cluster started in 2012 after the nomination of a new director of DPR, who had formerly worked at Shell. Their pro-
reform stance and desire to transform and improve DPR’s operational deficiencies resonated with DFID and FOSTER, which 
decided to engage with the agency on this person's request. The director went on to become the chair of the technical 
committee drafting the PIB, which further increased FOSTER’s interest in working with him. The objective of this cluster was 
thus to support the director of DPR in their mandate and to make DPR more transparent, accountable and efficient. The 
aim was also to prepare DPR for the post-PIB period, in particular through improving its management and processes.44 The 
engagement took place in two phases and included a mix of capacity-building, training, advice and research.
Phase 1 took place from 2011 to mid-2012, and aimed to identify DPR’s needs, offer advice and build staff ’s skills and 
knowledge to formulate and manage the restructuring envisaged. For example, FOSTER consultants ran a change manage-
ment session for the DPR Transformation Team (TT) to provide them with tools to manage change and to help them identify 
priorities. A consultant who had been a key interlocutor in introducing FOSTER to the DPR director was embedded as an 
advisor to the director to support DPR strategic communication and the activities of the TT. While the relationship of this 
advisor with the director was integral to FOSTER having a foot in the door in DPR, it also became the intervention’s undoing 
over time. The advisor acted as a gatekeeper to the director rather than as an interlocutor, and failed to share information 
with FOSTER. 
44 The PIB draft at this time provided for DPR to be transformed into an independent regulator, the Nigerian Petroleum Inspectorate.
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FOSTER also provided DPR with policy advice and recommendations on how to improve licensing rounds, following its 
announcement of its intention to hold a marginal field licensing round in late 2012. This was a key test of whether the head 
of DPR could be a ‘pocket of effectiveness’ (Roll, 2013) within a challenging political environment. They proved not to be after 
the planned round did not happen and the minister granted a number of licences on a discretionary basis. 
Phase 2 started during the second half of 2012 and aimed to provide advisory support to the DPR TT in planning for the 
reform agenda. The embedded advisor in Phase 1 continued in post. A second advisor was brought on board to work on 
the human resources dimension, a third to work on the overall change plan and a fourth to provide regulatory advice on 
reforming DPR into the Upstream Petroleum Inspectorate (post-PIB role). Despite the limitations noted above, the access 
and influence of the advisor from Phase 1 took precedence over the value produced until that point. The DPR director 
had specifically requested that the consultant continue in the role, and the FOSTER team was afraid that firing them would 
endanger the relationship with the director. Instead, FOSTER removed them from their management position and handed 
over this role to the new consultant working on the overall change plan. 
This phase also encountered problems. Initially, the terms of reference for the phase were elaborated without discussion with 
DPR, and did not take into account the work DPR had done since the end of Phase 1. This hindered the formation of a strong 
relationship with DPR for Phase 2 from the offset. The terms of reference were subsequently adjusted to take DPR’s previous 
work into account and Phase 2 was able to start, but tensions between the Phase 1 advisor and one of the new hires who 
was leading on project management materialised, along with tensions between the original advisor and the TT. And, ultimately, 
all of this engagement came to an end when the director was removed from their position by a more senior official.
After this phase, the engagement with DPR ended. Interviews and FOSTER’s internal documents suggested different reasons 
for this. DFID (2013) points to a funding cut at DFID level and the proximity of the general elections, which reduced the 
space for institutional reforms. In interviews, however, despite no significant restructuring or increases in transparency in 
the marginal fields licensing round materialising during the period of FOSTER support, a DPR staff member of the TT team 
asserted that, through its support to the TT, FOSTER had improved DPR’s vision and understanding of itself as an indepen-
dent regulator working for the interest of Nigerian citizens.45 It was also claimed that many changes later implemented by 
DPR had resulted directly from FOSTER support. An example was DPR’s migration to electronic licensing,46 which was based 
on one of the FOSTER consultants’ work on the DPR website and licensing process. FOSTER did not track unintentional 
results on this cluster, which could have helped in substantiating these interview findings. 
The main lessons from this case are as follows:
• Relying on more than individual reform champions: This intervention was centred on the assumption that the DPR 
director was engaged in and would implement reforms. Several FOSTER staff and consultants shared the view that, in 
the Nigerian political economy context, the DPR engagement had little chance of success. Given the limited traction 
of Phase 1 of the intervention, a step back to reassess the DPR director’s room for manoeuvre should have helped 
the team conclude that the political context was so constraining as to make substantial reform impossible. 
• Clear programme incentives: FOSTER and DFID viewed the director as a reformer. It was expected that, by provid-
ing marginal support over time, it would be possible to achieve a significant transformation, and there was a disincen-
tive to ending the initiative without results. Had there been clear criteria for success, Phase 1 could have been used 
as an example of ‘failing fast and learning quickly’. However, the process to allow this was not in place. 
• Access versus ability to deliver: The hiring of a consultant because of their access to the director caused consider-
able problems. Allowing the consultant to direct the relationship with DPR in turn hindered communication channels 
between FOSTER and DPR. 
• Demand-driven throughout: The DPR engagement was initially demand-driven but at the beginning of Phase 2 
ownership was low. FOSTER did not re-engage adequately with DPR in order to overcome this. This in turn led DPR 
to have expectations that FOSTER could not meet.
• A shared vision of success and failure: All actors involved in the intervention had different understandings of what 
success was supposed to look like, which complicated decisions on when to stop support. There was a need for 
better communication between the different levels involved in this cluster to enable agreement on a general goal.
• Flexibility and adaptability: This cluster was not very flexible or adaptive in its approach. When the project showed 
signs of failure, the results and the incentives of the actors (FOSTER, OPM, DFID and DPR) were not reflected upon 
– hindering potential for adaptation.
45 For example, FOSTER consultants helped draft corporate statements and identify the core values of DPR.
46 DPR processes applications for various licences, permits and approvals across the entire oil and gas value chain. The Oil and Gas 
Industry Service Permits portal is now accessible online: https://ogisp.dpr.gov.ng/Login
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• Tracking and monitoring results: More systematic tracking and monitoring of results would have allowed better 
understanding of the impact of these interventions. It is possible that the cluster had a non-negligible impact on the 
restructuring of DPR after the end of FOSTER support, but FOSTER’s M&E process did not track this. 
This case study is an example of an intervention being carried out in a technocratic and apolitical manner – unlike the norm 
in FOSTER. A clear lesson is the need for a shared vision upfront, at all levels, about what success from an intervention looks 
like and at what point DFID-funded technical assistance should stop. The underlying assumption was that DPR was a ‘pocket 
of effectiveness’, with the test being whether DPR was able to obtain transparent, accountable and efficient licensing arrange-
ments; the reality was that it was not as reform-minded as was perceived to be the case. 
Another lesson is that there was insufficient prioritisation of the key stakeholders and mapping out of their relationships. 
The cluster needed to look not only at the group/individuals with the greatest influence (primary target audiences) and their 
relative impact but also at who influenced them (secondary target audiences) and who influenced the secondary influencers. 
The intervention struggled to channel information up the correct paths. 
This case study is an example of an intervention that suffered from a combination of factors, which, together, made success 
impossible. While it may have been sensible to seize the opportunity created by the appointment of a new reformist director, 
this did not change the fundamental power relationships in the sector that made success unlikely. Reluctance to damage 
important relationships resulted in unwillingness to make decisive changes in personnel, while lack of a shared vision with the 
partner inevitably led to disappointment with the final results. 
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Lessons: The factors 
driving successes and 
failures
FOSTER was a successful programme working in a highly sensitive area, and during its five years of implementation helped 
Nigeria transform its governance of the oil and gas industry. It also put TWP into action. The successes and failures outlined 
above point to important lessons for TWP programmes in general. Specifically, this section highlights lessons on three issues: 
the process of interventions – that is, how they were implemented; the content of interventions – that is, what was done; and 
the politics of interventions, including how the programme worked politically and dealt with internal incentives.
The process of interventions
Well-connected and knowledgeable team
Delivery of results under FOSTER was as much about how the programme worked as it was about what it did. In particular, 
given that interventions needed to evolve as opportunities emerged, the leadership and team were critical to programme 
delivery. DFID and OPM deliberately sought to have a fully Nigerian permanent programme management team, and identi-
fied team members who provided high-level political access and leverage. In addition, FOSTER drew from the rich talent pool 
that lies within this section of professional Nigerians, including from the diaspora, who have chosen professional occupations 
in the oil and gas and professional services industry. The team’s contacts and networks were instrumental in their ability to 
respond at the right time to the right issues.
FOSTER’s successful relationship-building was also about good timing. Certain events in a political cycle may be more favour-
able than others for the initiation of new relationships, and opportunities for reform are often urgent or fleeting. FOSTER’s 
team worked by being ‘on call’, including during evenings and weekends. This built confidence among various partners that its 
members were committed and could rise to the occasion, should a window of opportunity open.
One of the key features of success throughout FOSTER’s clusters of interventions was the FOSTER team’s knowledge of 
and access to both demand- and supply-side actors and their understanding of the political environment. The core FOSTER 
staff remained largely the same throughout, and this enabled the team to further develop its network and knowledge and 
build on this social capital. Access and knowledge were a particularly important factor in identifying the right people to work 
with. Hence, FOSTER staff were politically well informed and had the political skills and access to identify and engage with 
key actors (e.g. NEITI, PIB, demand-side actors). This is a necessary feature of TWP programmes. 
While there are generic partnership skills that the FOSTER team demonstrated, finding the right people was not an easy 
task. The team needed people to be politically smart; to be able to work within a challenging and complex political context; 
and to have strong technical experience, skills and knowledge of the oil and gas sector and of governance reform; but also 
to have excellent people skills, with a demonstrated ability to influence, build and maintain relationships with stakeholders 
in the oil and gas sector, as well as with DFID. This was a huge wish list, and the TWP literature and debates need to pay 
more attention to the challenges involved in pulling together a team that collectively has these skills. In particular, identifying 
‘development entrepreneurs’ (Faustino and Booth, 2014) interested in convening, coordinating and facilitating others to 
achieve developmental objectives appears to be key. 
Flexibility, adaptability and learning
Another reason for FOSTER’s success appears to be the flexibility with which it could choose its partners. Many programmes 
define their partners in advance (e.g. a government ministry or agency or a particular organisation or institution). FOSTER’s 
experience suggests the appropriateness of the partner to achieve programme goals can shift over time. Had FOSTER been 
locked into working with particular institutions upfront, it would never have been able to achieve the successes it did. Rather, 
its ability to engage with new organisations, both in government and outside, based on opportunities for reform, was critical, 
as was the ability to disengage from organisations where activities were not yielding results.  
Flexibility and adaptability were defining features of FOSTER. They were integrated as part of the design to enable the 
programme to work with a range of actors on both the demand and the supply side according to Nigeria’s rapidly changing 
political economy. The aim was to work with demand and follow political momentum. No money was thus pre-allocated 
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to particular activities, and this allowed for experimentation and adaptation. Flexibility and adaptability, or in some instances 
the lack of these, were important factors in successes and failures. Indeed, FOSTER’s flexibility and ongoing learning enabled 
it to seize political opportunities to support reform (e.g. NEITI, demand-side actors). These features also enabled the team 
to quickly reorient interventions (e.g. demand-side actors). More generally, they enabled FOSTER to adapt to the political 
context by shifting the balance of its work from demand-side to supply-side actors, back to the demand side and then to a 
mix of demand and supply side. Conversely, the oil spill and DPR case studies show a lack of flexibility and learning, which 
contributed to the failure of these interventions. In these cases, FOSTER began implementation before testing the assump-
tions driving the interventions.
Demand-driven and locally owned interventions
FOSTER programming was designed to be demand-driven – that is, to respond to the demands, needs and agendas of 
partners. In general, this emphasis was maintained throughout the different clusters of interventions (e.g. NEITI, demand-side 
actors). An exception was the DPR cluster, when FOSTER tried to implement an intervention without thoroughly discussing 
it with DPR. This case is particularly illustrative of the importance of locally owned interventions for TWP programmes. Here, 
the communication challenges and lack of synergy in the objectives of the support provided diluted the potential for success. 
Management
In the literature on TWP programmes, management is an ongoing challenge (see SAVI, 2014 for another account of this). A 
balance needs to be maintained between promoting flexibility and adaptability and ensuring good management. Operating 
in flexible and adaptive way in a highly sensitive sector, while ensuring reputational risks are adequately mitigated, requires 
a consistently strong decentralised programme presence. This means programmes need to balance robust programme 
management with a politically savvy team that can spot and create opportunities and that has a strong risk mitigation focus. 
All these factors were needed from both DFID’s oversight side and FOSTER’s programme delivery side. 
In general, the FOSTER team was strong during the five years of the programme, but there were challenges ensuring insti-
tutional learning and consistency of top-level management. This had largely been addressed by the end of the programme, 
but staff turnover was an issue. Considering the long list of necessary – rather than simply desirable – traits that programmes 
like FOSTER need in their staff, this raises important questions about how to keep staff over five-year donor programmes 
where fees are static and job posts remain the same. This includes, for example, finding ways to promote people easily and 
to give pay rises. The new phase of FOSTER is trying to address this issue, but it is still a challenge. This is an additional human 
resources problem to the one most often identified in the TWP literature – that of high turnover among staff in international 
service providers and donors. How do programmes better retain and reward talented, in-demand country staff over the life 
of the programme? 
Monitoring and evaluating results
FOSTER followed all of the usual donor processes of gathering documentation to provide evidence about achievement 
of its log frame output and outcome targets, and these are reflected in its quarterly and annual reports as well as the 
project completion report. Perhaps more importantly, it also instituted internal informal mechanisms for sharing feedback on 
concepts for interventions, and progress and problems encountered. This took the form of frequent team meetings where all 
team members shared ideas and challenges and gave advice and suggestions on the best way of proceeding. This also helped 
ensure inter-linkages between different programme components were taken into account throughout. This represented a 
rapid feedback mechanism that made it possible to make adjustments to interventions in real time.  
However, this informal process was not well documented. Also, in many cases, FOSTER did not invest significantly in gathering 
detailed evidence about the assumptions underpinning interventions or in undertaking analysis to substantiate the proposed 
course of action. Reliance on an informal approach enabled FOSTER to be highly responsive, and it is important to note that, 
for most interventions, this probably outweighed the value of spending more time on analysis and design upfront. However, 
on occasions it resulted in FOSTER entering into interventions that a more rigorous challenge process might have precluded. 
Moreover, FOSTER did not expend much effort documenting the decisions and the processes that it followed. While this 
is understandable for a programme focused on delivery, it meant missing an opportunity to draw broader lessons about 
whether and how the ‘thinking and working politically’ was working. Indeed, it was this weakness, flagged by DFID, that led to 
the commissioning of the present study. 
This points to an important lesson – the need for programmes of this kind to build in an independent mechanism to evaluate 
their successes and failures. While annual reviews by the funder can go some way towards achieving this, the speed with 
which they have to be undertaken means conversations with all the relevant stakeholders are often not possible. Having an 
independent group conduct a rigorous investigation of the strengths and weaknesses of the approach can provide not only 
valuable lessons for the programme team but useful lessons for the wider policy, practitioner and academic communities.
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At the same time, it is important that the log frame facilitates the tracking of results. In FOSTER’s case, the absence of 
‘improving the knowledge of key stakeholders and the quality of public debate’ as an output meant important results were 
not tracked as systematically as they might have been (e.g. some of the very good results from the PIB and demand-side 
actors). This could have been rectified by updating the log frame. However, this is a more general problem associated with 
designing M&E systems so they capture not only delivery against what was intended but also new and sometimes unintended 
results that can nonetheless contribute significantly to the programme’s overall outcome. It is also important to embed ways 
of recognising where these new results point to changes needed in the theory of change.
Finally, an inherent challenge in all programmes that attempt to tackle deep-seated structural and behavioural norms is 
that change can take much longer than the period of the programme itself. It is likely that many outcomes stemming from 
FOSTER’s work will emerge after the time span of the programme is over. This suggests donors may wish to consider 
commissioning separate long-range studies that look at the impact of projects over a 20-year time horizon (as recently done 
by DFID for its power sector work in India [Deloitte, 2015]) in order to capture the extent to which a series of programmes 
has contributed towards major governance changes over the longer term.
The content of interventions
Connecting and building the capacities of stakeholders
Key to the success of FOSTER was its emphasis on connecting stakeholders and creating and supporting platforms for reforms. 
FOSTER was uniquely placed to carry out this work: it evolved to become a programme that worked ‘discreetly’ – not branding 
any documentation and often not advertising that interventions were funded by FOSTER – and thus played an ‘orchestrating 
role’ behind the scenes (e.g. PIB, NEITI, demand-side actors). This discreet approach came about in the first year of the program-
ming after experimenting with a FOSTER ‘brand’, which led to negative experiences. Moreover, the emphasis on strengthening 
relations between CSOs and the media was particularly useful to give more visibility and leverage to advocacy initiatives. At the 
same time, FOSTER invested significantly in building the capacity of its partners (e.g. NEITI, demand-side actors). This successful 
strategy involved ‘both playing a convening role, and developing the capacities of local actors and organizations, so that they can 
competently engage in change strategies involving state actors and institutions’ (Halloran, 2014: 3).
Disseminating information and research
The dissemination of information and research was at the core of many of FOSTER’s clusters of interventions. Its strategy 
was twofold: commissioning a significant number of pieces of research on oil sector issues and disseminating them to all 
relevant stakeholders; and focusing on simplifying information already available before disseminating it to stakeholders. In 
all clusters, this strategy was possible. First, FOSTER remained ‘discreet’ – no information was FOSTER- or DFID/UKAid-
branded – which created more incentives for partners to use it. Second, FOSTER became a neutral repository of knowledge. 
Many actors came to FOSTER for reliable information, and this enabled the programme to shape public debates on oil (e.g. 
on the PIB). This strategy is key for a governance and accountability programme such as FOSTER that aims, among other 
things, to increase public pressure on government to trigger reforms.
Being clear on what success and failure look like
Programmes operating in highly politically challenging areas need upfront common ownership of what the success of an 
intervention (or indeed cluster) looks like, and under what conditions the funder and/or team would phase out support. 
The variety of different views from the FOSTER team and consultants, seen in the PIB and DPR studies for example, shows 
that this did not happen as well as it could have in some instances. In some cases, FOSTER’s interventions failed because of a 
lack of clarity, or a lack of agreement with local partners, about what they were attempting to achieve. While it is not always 
possible to define a precise common vision in advance of every intervention – ownership is often built through the process 
of working together – long-term success depends on clarity about objectives, the sort of support programmes like FOSTER 
can and cannot provide and the circumstances in which that support will end.  
The politics of interventions
Understanding and adapting to the political context
As the Thinking & Working Politically Community of Practice (2015: 1) has explained, 
Evidence tells us that domestic political factors are usually much more important in determining develop-
mental impact than the scale of aid funding or the technical quality of programming. Although international 
development organisations have made extensive efforts to improve the technical quality of programmes, in 
many cases, these improvements have not led to greater impact during implementation. Successful implemen-
tation usually happens when programmes are aligned with a domestic support base that is influential enough 
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to generate reform momentum, and overcome the resistance of those benefitting from the status quo. Too 
many times over the past few decades, we have seen projects fail because they demand changes that are not 
politically feasible. 
TWP is based on the premise that, if programme teams can get the ‘politics’ right, they maximise their ability to have real 
impact. Effective programme delivery depends on a team’s ability to grasp and navigate the political context. Problem-driven 
and sector-specific PEA was at the core of how FOSTER worked, complemented by wide-ranging engagement within the oil 
and gas industry and with the political economy of policy more broadly. 
FOSTER commissioned quarterly PEAs, based on triangulation of findings from stakeholder analysis and power mapping, 
key informant interviews and quantitative evidence, and conducted by experts with strong networks within the Nigerian oil 
and gas sector, as well as politics and policy more broadly. In addition, some issue-specific PEAs guided the design, delivery 
or review of interventions or clusters of interventions. For example, a PEA on the fuel subsidy system sought to identify 
corruption and inefficiencies in the supply chain. It helped the team identify which issues to work on and highlighted the 
key stakeholders and how to interact with them. The findings from the PEA were validated and absorbed by the core team, 
as well as partners and stakeholders at quarterly workshops. The purpose was to consider the implications for subsequent 
programming. FOSTER’s experience was that this validation process was an important tool for sense-checking PEAs and 
making sure they reflected a nuanced perspective of the political economy context.
It was also critical that the team could think, operate and communicate in a politically smart way on a daily basis. Being deeply 
informed by the political context in which it worked was a critical element to successful engagement with government and 
accountability actors, and to building the relationships that are a vital part of effective programming in Nigeria. The FOSTER 
team’s contacts and networks were instrumental in its ability to respond at the right time to the right issues. Operating in 
a politically smart way was also crucial for effective risk management and the ability to innovate and adapt as the political 
economy evolved. We touch on these elements in discussing relationships and risk, below.
Informal political assessments were conducted: ‘each time you go to an organisation, you put your ears to the ground, to 
know who has been removed, why he has been removed, who has been appointed, where they are sent to’ (interview 
with FOSTER team member). This iterative and informal way of capturing political information was reasonably successful – 
especially when combined with the formal quarterly PEA work. However, PEA has its limits, and is not some sort of ‘magic 
key’ (Rothstein, 2011). Sometimes, the assumptions driving the clusters were not based on good enough research analysing 
the socio-political context (e.g. DPR). As stressed by a FOSTER associate and consultant, ‘identifying change makers and 
establish[ing] relationships with them is not enough. You need to look at the political context in which they are operating: 
what incentives and influence they have, would they actually be allowed to do so?’ The DPR and PIB clusters for example, 
ultimately pushed against more powerful stakeholders with a different agenda who were able to prevent reform from taking 
place(interviews with FOSTER staff and consultants). 
In spite of the more formal PEA process, there was a need to think through how to ensure these PEAs could have the 
maximum usability for the FOSTER team in Nigeria as well as the service provider and DFID. This is a common problem 
underlined by the TWP literature (Hout, 2012: 406; Rocha Menocal, 2014; Fisher & Marquette, 2016). While PEAs encour-
aged a culture of critical reflection within FOSTER, and were linked to intervention design and quarterly workplans, there is 
now thinking that there should also be PEAs that look at ‘thematic clusters’ of interventions. This recognises that doing a PEA 
for every intervention does not represent value for money and is not appropriate, but that a broader quarterly PEA does 
not have enough nuance to support the theory of change on specific types of intervention clusters. 
Political analysis should enable staff to understand ‘how political actors interact and jostle not only with each other but also 
against, around and with the structural and institutional context they operate in, using the resources and opportunities it 
provides’ (Hudson & Leftwich, 2014: 7). This understanding of the interactions between structure and agency in political 
processes was occasionally weak in FOSTER.47 Learning from this experience, cluster-specific PEAs are now being used under 
FOSTER II to enable FOSTER management to challenge the assumptions of interventions and enrich the FOSTER team’s 
discussion on whether it reflects the current political reality.48  
Theory of Change
The original vision for FOSTER in January 2011 was remarkably broad and intentionally open: to support policy reforms, 
strengthen accountability actors and mechanisms and increase transparency. FOSTER’s response was to pioneer and gradually 
systemise an approach that was built on three principles: 1) deep, regular, PEA; 2) the use of this intelligence to nurture relation-
ships with sympathetic stakeholders, and to craft contextually relevant interventions; and 3) working discreetly to minimise 
risk to DFID and FOSTER itself. The evolution of FOSTER’s work was sharply reflective of the country and sector’s changing 
political and governance landscape. There were initially minimal opportunities for engagement with the supply-side institutions. 
47 One way forward could be an adaptation of the Everyday Political Analysis framework developed by Hudson, Marquette, and Wal-
dock (2016), which focuses on structure and agency and is designed for this sort of gap in formal ‘set piece’ PEA provision.
48 Each intervention idea went through a collegial discussion where each member of the team gave their opinion.
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FOSTER therefore began as a fund that supported ‘demand-side’ pressures for transparency and reform, with a special focus on 
strengthening NEITI and building the capacity of demand-side actors to deliver effective advocacy around NEITI reports. This 
gradually led to increased collaboration with supply-side actors in government, such as in setting up the Petroleum Unit in the 
Ministry of Finance, a strand of work that grew exponentially after the election of President Buhari in 2015. The lessons from 
this work provided the foundation for FOSTER’s ‘pincer’ approach – a theory of change based on promoting transparency and 
external demand for change and offering ready support to champions of reform within government. 
In general, FOSTER’s processes when initiating a cluster were very informal. There were no explicit theories of change at 
the intervention or cluster level. The case studies assessed as part of this research suggest that at times this led to design 
and implementation decisions that were not sufficiently linked to a clear logic model on how change would materialise and 
why reform may be resisted. A theory of change was sometimes suggested but rarely explicit. While it is important to stress 
that the informality of FOSTER was one of its main strengths, as it enabled its flexibility and adaptability, it also sometimes 
hindered its capacity to be strategic and reflect on the ‘big picture’ in each cluster – that is, what FOSTER wanted to achieve. 
Particularly for programmes working in highly politically challenging environments, there needs to be upfront agreement of 
what the success of a cluster looks like and under what conditions the funder and/or team should phase out support. A 
theory of change could be elaborated for each cluster in a flexible way, whereby the goals to achieve are specified and the 
pathways to change are presented as undetermined but assessed as achievable by looking at the context, actors, power 
relations and challenges at specific moments and for a specific issue-area.49 This theory of change would need to be regularly 
revisited throughout the implementation of the cluster. 
Risk 
DFID had a high tolerance for risk to results in this programme, recognising the politically complex and challenging nature of 
the area of work. It had a much lower risk appetite in other areas, such as in terms of reputational risk where work emanating 
from the FOSTER team could potentially undermine UK relationships with Nigeria and threaten broader aid programming 
in the country. In this respect, DFID expected OPM and the FOSTER team to mitigate these risks, and both DFID and 
OPM made an ongoing effort to make sure controversial incidents did not curtail the innovative and challenging work of 
the FOSTER team. FOSTER’s ‘discreet’ approach was not designed, but came about in the first year of the programming 
after FOSTER had produced a policy brief under the FOSTER brand and carried out a television interview using FOSTER 
branding. DFID and the FOSTER team agreed shortly afterwards that this would not be a sustainable way of operating, and 
FOSTER adjusted its approach to facilitate external partners. 
A similar problem emerged later in the programme after the election of President Buhari, when opportunities for engage-
ment with government opened up significantly. In this situation, the programme had to pivot from a focus on demand-side 
work to much greater work with government. Having both demand- and supply-side interventions within the programme 
was a great strength of FOSTER, since it allowed the programme to switch focus based on context. However, this needed 
to be handled very carefully, since the activities of programme-supported civil society actors could damage the relationships 
the same programme was attempting to build with leading reformers within government.  
DFID50 
Tackling the entrenched interests of elites is a potentially uncomfortable area for donors. It requires engagement with local 
politics; experimentation in order to seek out different strands of commitment for reform within government and outside; 
and sometimes significant risk. But it can deliver major results. Several aspects of DFID’s role in the FOSTER case hold 
important general lessons for the understanding of when and how TWP programmes can work.
First, DFID was willing to experiment. At the time that the FOSTER design was selected, DFID had relatively few programmes 
designed explicitly to attempt to think and work politically. However, DFID Nigeria had a long tradition of experimenting with 
new approaches, grounded in its early work on Drivers of Change. This was born of the challenges faced by programmes 
in Nigeria in dealing with a highly complex and fluid governance environment, which made it difficult for more traditional 
approaches to find traction on reform. As a result, DFID was more open to experimenting with new approaches to support 
pro-poor change in Nigeria.  
49 McGee and Gaventa (2011: 37) rightly highlight that ‘The kind of theory of change that is needed is not one developed in the 
abstract that reflects a notion of change processes as linear, predictable and rigid (…). The point is, rather, that it is necessary to sur-
face and make explicit the pathways via which complex initiatives, destined to take effect in complex circumstances, are expected 
to have their effect and to continuously revisit this throughout the initiative, in recognition that social contexts and processes are 
always in flux, with emerging issues, unforeseen risks and surprises arising throughout’ (cited in Halloran, 2014: 4). See also Faustino 
and Booth (2014: xii), who advocate the elaboration of multiple, time-specific theories of change.
50 For an overview of FOSTER from DFID’s perspective, see Bhalla, Waddell, and Ough (2016). It should be noted that DFID is one 
of a relatively small number of donors that have made a serious attempt to find effective ways of implementing innovative TWP 
programmes in the extractive sector, such as FOSTER.
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Perhaps equally important, the DFID senior responsible officer (SRO) for the FOSTER programme stayed the same 
throughout. This is highly unusual: SROs usually rotate in and out of position at least every three years. Having the same 
individual committed to the success of the programme over its duration meant FOSTER had a decision-maker and critical 
interlocutor who was increasingly knowledgeable, both about the politics of the country and about the sector. 
This does not mean FOSTER faced no challenges as a result of potential mismatches between DFID’s institutional incentives 
and systems and the aims of the programme. For example, although in principle DFID was keen to experiment and take 
risks, respondents suggested that – in practice – DFID seemed to become more risk-averse as the programme proceeded. 
While there is no way to say conclusively that this was the case, the recent shift towards ‘payment by results’ may work to 
make DFID and its implementing partners more risk-averse overall (Clist, 2016). Notwithstanding this, the key to success 
in FOSTER’s case was the commitment by DFID, OPM and the FOSTER team to find ways of accommodating the various 
political and institutional incentives they faced, while still allowing the local team to lead the engagement in the reform agenda 
in a politically smart, flexible and adaptive manner.
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Conclusions
This paper has assessed whether FOSTER has been able to ‘think and work politically’ to improve the governance of the oil 
sector in Nigeria. The findings aim both to inform future FOSTER programming and to contribute to the wider evidence base 
on TWP in aid programmes. The case studies show that FOSTER took advantage of its experimental design along the lines 
of a TWP approach – for example flexible funding and no predefined interventions. This enabled it to be, to some extent, 
flexible and adaptive to its political environment, and to launch creative and innovative interventions. FOSTER’s originality 
also lay in its cluster approach, through which it worked on defined oil sector governance problems across different types of 
actor, on both the demand and the supply side, to mobilise pro-reform efforts.
On the basis of these five case studies, it can be said that FOSTER’s work up to 2015 on the demand side was more impactful 
than its work with government actors. Given the Nigerian socio-political environment from 2011–2015, this is not surprising: 
the space for institutional reform was very small.51 The most significant results concerned improvement of the public debate 
and of the knowledge of stakeholders around oil sector issues, which was significant during FOSTER’s first four years of work. 
This should be emphasised and commended in light of the weak level of public debate on oil sector issues in Nigeria. This 
was reported by all the journalists, civil society activists and institutional actors interviewed for this paper. 
FOSTER’s support in developing the capacity and/or the advocacy initiatives of CSOs and the media, and its focus on 
commissioning and disseminating research and information, was key to this improvement. Through this pathway, FOSTER 
managed to put pressure on government agencies, which, to some extent, responded to the issues CSOs and the media 
raised. 
The most significant challenges for FOSTER were the political environment and the complexity of the political economy 
of the oil sector in Nigeria. Other challenges were linked to the difficulties of implementing any TWP programme, such as 
finding the right balance between flexibility and informality on the one side and good management procedures on the other; 
how to use political analysis appropriately; how to monitor and evaluate results and integrate learning into programming; and 
how to balance risk with opportunities for results.
Despite these challenges, the lessons drawn from these case studies show the value of ‘thinking and working politically’ for a 
development programme. FOSTER managed to achieve some remarkable successes in an extremely unfavourable political 
environment as a result of taking this approach. At the same time, better understanding of the failures is extremely valuable, 
since these show the challenges of a TWP approach for development agencies and the trade-offs that have to be made when 
implementing it. They also show that some failure may be unavoidable, because of political complexities and changes, but that 
a politically savvy, adaptive approach can support fast learning and adjustment.  
This paper hopes to contribute to the discussion on TWP evidence and on programme design, but also to highlight the value 
of considering both success and failure for better learning and adaptation going forward. 
51 FOSTER has had considerable success with supply-side interventions since the appointment of a new government in the last quar-
ter of 2016. For example, FOSTER has provided extensive support to NNPC, enabling it to publish a detailed annual report for the 
first time in many years.
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